V. Opposite Forces

It is acknowledged that, within any system, “for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.” In the particular case of the ascension of Assyria as a great power, this disruptive action of the political system in the Near East resulted in a response from the affected units in the system —namely Babylonia and Hatti— which was aimed to balance and, if possible, to eliminate such disruptive stimulus. Nevertheless, Assyria, in turn, reacted to its rivals’ response, too, by accommodating within its environment.

The development analyzed here can be considered using game theory.

As it is clear, in this game, there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. First, if Egypt had had to choose between politically backing either Babylonia and Hatti or Assyria against these two, it would have been in the interest of the Pharaoh to prefer the latter, in every case. Because the Egyptian king strictly preferred another power next to Hatti to distract its attention and balance its power in the region.

Second, Babylonia and Hatti, not knowing Assyria’s intentions, would have evaluated what Assyria might have chosen and they would have realized that Ashur-uballit’s dominant strategy was always to choose to arise and expand. Therefore, comparing their options, Babylonia and Hatti realized that the options of going to war —“violently responding”— against the rising expansionist Assyria and “not responding” were strictly dominated by the strategy of implementing a non-violent political response. This because the costs of going to war against a peer in the distribution of power are high and the uncertainty of such a conflict is profound; on top of that, by doing nothing they would have risked their survival before an expansionist Assyria.

Third, assessing the payoffs from both strategies, and contemplating the others’ logical responses, Assyria would have chosen to overcome Mitani’s rule, arise and expand within the limits of its capabilities This was Ashur-uballit’s dominant strategy, because, he would have always achieved better results by following this policy than by rising over Mitanni and stopping. Even more, in view of its best choice and the surrounding environment, the policies of prestige and balancing followed by Assyria were used as a means to increase and maintain the general tendency of the game by openly signaling to the other players and by asserting their perceptions that Assyria was indeed a new great kingdom, in power parity before its neighbors.

The argument presented at the beginning of this essay, on how the disruption in a political system by the ascension of a new great player takes place and develops, is reinforced by the results of the strategic model presented in this part of the text. What has been logically deduced and stated as the outcome of this political game is the actual historical outcome of the disruption set by Assyria at the moment of its ascension.