IV. The Challenger

Assyrian king.jpg

Depiction of the king from the Neo-Assyrian period.

"The Royal Lion Hunt," Assyrian c. 645-635 BC, Nineveh, North Palace, Iraq.

Once Assyria had overcome the empire that Mitanni had imposed over it, the next step was to increase its power, while building its dominion and influence.  Nevertheless, as any change in the hierarchy of political power also comes with high costs for the ascending power, after acquiring the new position among the great powers, Assyria was relatively weakened. Therefore, in order to maintain its newly acquired position in the distribution of power, it followed two complementary policies: one of political prestige and the other of balancing the potential responses from its rivals.

As information in the struggle for power is always incomplete and limited, power is mainly based on the perception of it —nevertheless, when it is actually deployed in an open and direct collision, it is always better that these perceptions be backed by reality; otherwise, the clash will show the painful reality behind the mask. Therefore, “[i]t is […] a necessary and important task to see to it that the mental picture other people form of one’s position in society at least represents faithfully the actual situation, if it does not excel it.” Thus, states pursue policies of prestige, in order to “[…] impress other nations with the power one’s own nation actually possesses, or with the power it believes, or wants the other nations to believe, it possesses.”[1]

This necessity of prestige for the newly arisen Assyria was clearly reflected in the letters that Ashur-uballit I wrote to the Egyptian Pharaoh. In the first place, he started exchanging gifts with the Egyptian king, as an equal, not as a vassal; he even stressed in the letter that he is the first of the Assyrian kings to contact him —as he was now a great king— and that he was showing his “goodwill”:

I have sent my envoy to you to visit you and your country. Until now, my predecessors have not sent word [cursives are mine]. Today, I have personally sent word to you. I have delivered one quality chariot, two horses and one date-stone of genuine lapis lazuli as your goodwill gift.

Even more, Ashur-uballit demanded his messenger to be treated kindly by the Pharaoh, as a sign of good faith to the Assyrian state: “Let him see your hospitality and the hospitality of your country, then let him depart.”

In the second place, shortly after, in the second letter to the Pharaoh, for the first time, the Assyrian king addressed the King of Egypt —the head of a country which, “[i]n terms of identity, continuity, monumentality, and power, […] had no equals”—[2] as “brother,” as an equal in power. “To Akhenaten, Great King, king of Egypt, my brother, speak: thus says Ashur-uballit, king of the land of Ashur, great king, your brother [cursives are mine] […].”

In the third place, on top of that, Ashur-uballit bluntly demanded in his second letter the Pharaoh to approach him as a peer and to treat his messengers as those of a great king.

Now, I am equal to the Hanigalbatean [(Mitannian)] king [—a former great king—], but you send only [some] gold, and it does not suffice for the expense of my messengers’ journey there and back.

[…] Why are my messengers made to stand around in the open sun, so that they die of sunstroke? If there is benefit to the king in standing in the open sun, then let them stand there and die of sunstroke, and let it benefit the kind. But if not, why should they die of sunstroke?

Thus, the king of the newly arisen great power of Assyria sought to present himself toward the Pharaoh —a doubtless powerful king— as an equal —as another great king—, as “brother.” By being accepted as a peer in the eyes of the king of Egypt, Assyria would have certainly been perceived as an equal by the other kings in the Near East.

Together with this policy of prestige, Ashur-uballit also sought to establish friendly relations with the king of Egypt as a way to balance potential threats from the neighboring empires. Toward Hatti, an alliance with Egypt would have meant for Assyria an increase in the capacity to deter this expanding empire; toward Babylonia, it would have resulted in a decrease in the tensions with this country and, certainly, total deterrence to any attempt from this country to militarily respond to the rise of Assyria. Therefore, in both of the analyzed letters, it is clear the attempt to friendly approach the Pharaoh, in order to earn his favor.

For the Assyrians, the way to assert its newly acquired position in the international system of the Near East, was by means of achieving international prestige and by balancing its rivals through an alliance with Egypt; both of these policies were needed in order to deter possible responses to the disruption of the international system that the Assyrian ascension meant for the political relations between the great kings.



[1] Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th edition, revised (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p. 78.

[2] David A. Warburton, referred chapter, p. 487.