III. The Fearful
As the most vulnerable player to the rise of Assyria was Babylonia, the most active (but cautious) response to the Assyrian disruption came from it: it tried to stop the Assyrian attempts to approach the Pharaoh; while it sought to diplomatically diminish the perception of the change in the distribution of power favorable to Assyria. As it is reflected in the letter the Babylonian king wrote to the Pharaoh, where he wanted the ruler of Egypt to think that the Assyrians were not just a lesser kingdom but also one under Babylonian dominion; “[…] [t]he Assyrians, vassals of mine,” says Burnaburiash II.
Even more, as the Egyptian lack of interest toward Babylonia made clear for the great kings that the Babylonian state had become a less relevant actor —merely treated as an observer—,[1] the Babylonians were even more sensitive to changes in the distribution of power. On the one hand, the Babylonian will to show power was reflected in the letter to the Pharaoh when the Babylonian king complained about the gifts sent by the ruler of Egypt:
Now, my brother has sent me only two mina of gold. But this is a very small amount: send, then, as much as your father did! And if you have little (gold), send half of what your father sent! Why have you sent me only two mina of gold? And you, whatever do you need from my land, write it, and it will be sent to you.
The message was provoking. While it aimed to test the Pharaoh to show his power and economic capacity; it also implicitly signaled that, unlike the Egyptian ruler, the king of Babylonia had indeed the capacity to sent the Pharaoh whatever he wished, as he was still a great king. Nonetheless, on the other hand, a contradiction is reflected further in the letter:
My father gave them [the Canaanites] the following answer: Forget the idea of dealing with me! I will not declare myself against my brother, the king of Egypt, nor will I treat with someone else! […] He is my ally. My father committed no acts against your father.
The king of Babylonia, after demonstrating his power to the Pharaoh, reminded him the loyalty that Babylonia had kept to the alliance between them. Why? Because, fearing the newly arisen Assyria and the increasing of its importance to Egypt, Burnaburiash II tried to resort to friendship as a means to stop the increasing ties of its Assyrian rival.
On top of that all, the Babylonian king openly tried to stop and obstruct the Assyrian attempts to establish a relation with the Egyptian king: “Why have they [the, so called, ‘Assyrian vassals’] been received in your land? If I am dear to you, do not let them conclude any business. May they return here with empty hands!” Once again, it is clear the mix between demonstration of power and resort of “friendship” that Burnaburiash II reflected in his letter, in order to impede the Assyrians to be taken as another great power and an actor worth to deal with.
All this was evidence of the Babylonian decline, of its fear derived from the disturbance in the distribution of power, and of its attempts to cope with this new situation. Babylonia, as the power most affected and most weakened in its position in the international distribution of power by the rise of Assyria, was highly responsive to the disruptive stimulus that the new great power infused in the political system of the Late-Bronze Near East.
Hatti’s fear toward the rise of Assyria was less than that of Babylonia, as the power of the former enabled it better to face a threat from the south of its border. The parity in the distribution of power between Hatti and Assyria could not easily be overcome by neither party. Nonetheless, the tension between them existed. Hatti’s response to the systemic disruption driven by Assyria was the establishment of a puppet, buffer Mitannian state next to Assyria, made out of the remains of Mitanni.
Shuppiluliuma had placed Shattiwaza, one of the sons of the murdered Tushratta on the throne of Mitanni. Supporting him through marriage treaties and military support, Shattiwaza had managed to re-establish Mitanni, more or less under Hittite tutelage. This was necessarily a provocation for Assyria.[2]
The Egyptian response to Assyria was one of compromised neutrality. While it did not openly embrace Assyria’s ascension, it did recognize its ruler as one of the great kings and established diplomatic relations with him. As it is reflected in Ashur-uballit’s second letter to the Pharaoh: “When I saw your messengers, I was very joyous. Your messengers will indeed reside in hospitality in my presence.” Egypt aimed not to obstruct Assyrian’s rise, but neither to openly help it in it. For the Egyptian state, the presence of Assyria in the region as a new challenging power was beneficial, as it played the role of a political distraction for Hatti; therefore, alleviating Hittite pressure in Syria and Palestine before the Egyptian interests in that contested zone.
These were the challenges that the rise of Assyria posed to the other great powers of the Late Bronze Age in the Near East. It is clear that the Assyrian strategy to achieve its independence from Mitanni, which resulted in its ascension into greatness, was a disruptive factor for the international political system in which it developed. Meanwhile, Assyria had to deal with the consequences of its power.