EXPLOITING CONFLICTED CLIENT KINGS

Gösta W. Ahlström, “Administration of the State in Canaan and Ancient Israel,” CANE 1:587–603, p. 594.

Mario Liverani, The Ancient Near East: History, Society and Economy (New York: Routledge, 2011), 335.

Having considered the organization of Egypt’s administration and communication, this discussion will finish with an examination of the Egyptian exploitation of the client kings of Canaan who were in frequent competition with one another. This examination will involve comments on both kingship and political organization in Canaan as well as the competition for loyalty with Egypt in which the client kings engaged.  

Kingship and Political Organization in Canaan 

Kingship in Canaan was patterned after the typical Semitic model (as opposed to Egyptian or Sumerian)[1] and it was considered a divine institution (though kings were not divinized like those in Egypt). It was also hereditary and typically passed on to the oldest son. With regard to the Canaanite client kings during the Amarna period, Ahlström writes:

The Syro-Palestinian states under Egypt’s rule were all governed by princes called in the Amarna letters ḫazannu, “chief magistrate, mayor, regent.” A parallel West Semitic term is špṭ, which means ruler and judge and, thus, can be used for a king. …

The ruler of Jerusalem, Abdi-Hepa, in one Amarna text is called (LÚ) ruḫi šarri, “friend of the king” (an old Egyptian title), here perhaps an honorary title for a vassal. The text refers to the ‘’divine” [sic] will of the pharaoh as having made Abdi-Khepa [sic] the ruler of Jerusalem, omitting the role of his father in this choice, even if that was the reality. The principle is thus that the gods place kings on their thrones—whether they are vassal kings or not.[2]

Thus, the client kings understood themselves as kings, but they were admittedly subservient to the pharaoh, their overlord, as noted by the conspicuous obeisance they offer in their letters. Their responsibilities included six main duties, according to Several:

(1) protect trade caravans, (2) provide and send tribute or taxes to the pharaoh, (3) provide supplies for imperial troops, (4) provide and supply corvee labour, (5) inform the pharaoh of local events, and (6) defend their cities and its territory, while maintaining loyalty to the pharaoh.[3]

The general political organization of Canaan in the Bronze Age was a collection of independent city-states that were in frequent conflict. It would not be until the Iron Age that these city-states would coalesce under emerging states like Israel or Judah.[4] When Egypt conquered and took control of Canaan and other areas of the Levant, it was probably not the intention of the pharaohs to eliminate all intercity conflicts, so long as they remained deferential to Egypt and paid their tributes, which would limit Egypt’s expenses in maintaining peace.[5]

Competing for Loyalty 

Egypt’s approach to limit their investment in maintaining peace allowed for them to exploit the conflicts of their client kings, which resulted in their competing for loyalty to the pharaoh.[6] Though loyalty was to be expected of conquered city-states, it was also gained by raising some of the children of the client kings in Egypt.[7] As for their competing for loyalty, Kuhrt notes, “Accusing each other of treachery to the Egyptian cause or deflecting such accusations by denouncing a neighbor was commonplace, while the writer drives home his own loyalty.”[8] For the client kings, professing their loyalty probably reassured them that the pharaoh would provide them with protection and benefits whereas for the pharaoh, such professions of loyalty reassured him that despite whatever conflicts the client kings had with one another, they were still under the heel of Egypt.[9]